What we're working on

Although access to education has substantially improved, most ten-year-olds in low- and middle-income countries are still unable to read. Fewer parents are sending their children to government schools, opting instead to enrol them in low-fee private schools and children continue to drop out of schools altogether. The Global South is still battling a learning crisis. 

One tool that governments use to try to improve learning outcomes is Public Private Partnerships (PPPs). Even though the evidence is still mixed on whether these ultimately improve learning, PPPs continue to spread – they are used to educate millions of children worldwide. 

The experience of Edo State, Nigeria shows that public-focused PPPs can work. But lasting change depends on defining the political goals of the partnership from the start and acting accordingly every step of the way.

Read the executive summary of the forthcoming product.

Nepal’s civil service serves political parties and the careers of senior bureaucrats more than the country's citizens. The new government has a once-in-a-generation chance to depoliticise the civil service and catalyse progressive change. Open PEA's product seeks to help stakeholders do this, as maintaining the status quo risks keeping Nepal stuck in its current low-growth, low-development, high-migration loop for decades to come.

Nigeria is Africa’s largest oil exporter, yet until recently it spent billions every year to subsidise the cost of imported fuel. This has long been recognised as a problem. But reform attempts have all stalled or been reversed in the face of political pressure.

A new attempt in May 2023 has so far held up remarkably well. But, despite strong economic logic, it too is struggling to survive the removal-reversal policy loop. Reformers must continue to navigate a diverse coalition of opposing actors if they are going to achieve durable reform. Open PEA's product seeks to provide a thorough understanding of fuel subsidy politics in Nigeria to make that task easier. 
 

Fuel subsidies, once implemented, are politically difficult to remove. The price of fuel is a major factor in the cost of living and production, so many governments subsidise fuel to keep downstream prices stable and affordable. But doing so comes with drawbacks. Fuel subsidies are expensive, poorly targeted and create incentives for smuggling. Done long-term, they can distort the allocation of economic resources, reduce productivity and slow economic growth. 

Bolivia’s current economic crisis illustrates this dilemma. Inflation is rising, economic activity is dropping, US dollars and fuel are scarce, and fuel subsidies sit at the centre of all of it. The fiscal burden they created undermined macroeconomic stability and economic growth, drained foreign currency reserves and diverted financing away from other development priorities. The government is now trying to push through reforms, but to be successful it must get the politics right. Open PEA’s product explains what happened and what still stands in the way, so others may learn from Bolivia’s experience.

Moto-taxis (boda boda) are the largest source of male urban employment in Uganda. They account for 30-40% of trips taken in the capital (Kampala), and create revenue streams for a range of tertiary actors – from roadside mechanics and street food vendors to petrochemical companies and motorcycle financiers.

At the same time, Uganda’s reliance on moto-taxis creates significant social, economic and political problems. It impacts public health through accidents and air pollution, perpetuates widespread precarious work, and slows down transport routes. Uganda could make strides on growth and development if it could reduce and regulate the sector, but the coalition of actors against such change is formidable. Open PEA’s product seeks to suggest politically feasible ways forward.

Students in Bangladesh learn little in class. Approximately half of primary school children cannot read Bangla at their grade level, and two-thirds are not proficient in mathematics. Teachers are neither motivated nor trained, and schools lack appropriate materials. Bangladesh is suffering a primary learning crisis.

Open PEA’s product makes the case that Bangladesh’s political elite either do not care enough about public education or do not act sufficiently to improve it. It appeals instead to the business elite, suggesting that they could use their interest in having a well-trained group of students coming out of the public education system to push for change.
 

Nigeria imports at least 70% of its medicines. Domestic production accounts for 30%, but is generally confined to a small group of basic treatments like paracetamol. This makes the country highly reliant on imports for some of its most acute pharmaceutical needs, like malaria, HIV/AIDS and tuberculosis. It is vulnerable to supply chain disruptions and external policy decisions that affect medicine availability and affordability – as Covid-19 showed. Open PEA’s product explores what it would take to grow Nigeria’s pharmaceutical production capacity and sophistication.

Nigeria has become one of the fastest-growing suppliers of recycled lead to the United States, driven by demand from the auto industry and regulation that pushed dirty smelters out of the US and Canada. Residents near recycling plants have complained for years of headaches, stomach pain, fatigue, memory loss, seizures and developmental delays in children, all consistent with lead poisoning. Regulatory enforcement is weak because it suits both foreign and domestic elite actors, and Nigerians are paying the price. Open PEA’s product explores what can be done.

Malawi’s exchange rate is not only a macroeconomic price. It is a political instrument, a rationing device and a source of rents. It helps determine who receives scarce foreign currency, who can import fuel, fertiliser and medicine, who can protect wealth, and who bears the cost of adjustment. Exchange rate reform is essential for unlocking growth and development, but it will not succeed if it is treated merely as a technocratic correction. Open PEA's product explores how durable reform fundamentally challenges Malawi’s elite bargain.

Bangladesh was long thought of as a paradox – a country with seemingly strong economic growth and human development outcomes, yet widespread corruption and poor governance. It is now clear that much of this progress was illusory. A politicised and collusive bureaucracy had facilitated wide-ranging corruption while helping successive Awami League governments to consolidate power and grow authoritarianism.

Since the uprisings that toppled the government in August 2024, Bangladesh has seen wide-ranging and open discussions about reforms. A consensus was reached in the ‘July Charter’, which the current government has committed to implementing, but which falls short of the changes needed to address the challenge of a politicised bureaucracy. Open PEA’s product explores what it would take for Bangladesh to seize this once-in-a-generation opportunity for civil service reform.

Nairobi is infamous for its traffic – covering 15km in two to three hours is normal. Nairobi's traffic costs the country an estimated $1–3bn a year (2% of GDP) in commuter time, firm productivity and investment. Nairobi is East Africa's largest economy and a regional hub for trade, finance and logistics. Fixing its transport bottleneck would unlock large productivity gains.

Much of this traffic is created by privately operated minibuses known as matatus. These cannot deliver the volume, safety, or price stability that a city as large as Nairobi needs. But an informal economy of police bribes, cartel-controlled routes, and shell-company ownership gives police and politically connected owners a direct financial stake in the status quo. Reforming the matatu economy will not be easy, but Open PEA’s product explores how this might be achieved anyway.

Bangladesh’s revenue system is in urgent need of reform. Its tax-to-GDP ratio is among the lowest globally (7%–9%), making the country dependent on borrowing and international aid. It is also regressive. Indirect taxes (eg VAT) disproportionately burden the poor, while Bangladesh’s elites avoid paying their fair  share. Finally, it is an engine for political capture; it has historically been the target of frequent looting and illicit financial flows.

Bangladesh’s malfunctioning revenue system constrains state investment in critical infrastructure, social services and poverty alleviation, undermining long-term growth, prosperity and equality. These problems are deeply rooted in structural inefficiencies, systemic corruption and the politicisation of tax policy and administration.

The August 2024 revolution and the toppling of the Awami League created a rare opportunity for putting Bangladesh’s revenue system onto a better track. Open PEA’s product examines the interests and incentives of key players alongside the formal and informal rules of the game to see what might be done.

Kenya’s public procurement system is a vital economic lever but also a longstanding governance challenge. It channels government spending into the infrastructure, goods, and services that are critical to delivering development and growth, and attracting investment. 

But an estimated 10–25% of Kenya’s public procurement budget is lost to corruption and inefficiency. The Office of the Auditor General consistently flags procurement irregularities, questionable awards, inflated prices and suspicious documentation, while the media regularly reports on procurement corruption, often involving politicians. These issues reduce the effectiveness of investment.

Many of these problems could be addressed by Kenya’s long-planned eGP system, which offers ‘end to end’ procurement and contract management. This could reduce existing inefficiency and make discretion, corruption and political capture more difficult to pull off and easier to detect. Open PEA’s product asks what politically feasible steps could be taken to finally get eGP up and running.